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Abstract
In this paper, we present an application of a method for
solving the multi-objective programming problem (the MP
method), which was introduced in [1]. This method is used
to solve the problem of distribution (the problem of cost/
profit allocation). The method is based on the principles of
cooperative games and linear programming. In the paper,
we consider the standard case (proportional distribution)
and the generalized case in which the basic ideas of
coalitions have been incorporated. The presented theory is
applied and explained on an investment model for eco‐
nomic recovery.
Keywords Problem of distribution, cooperative games,
multi-objective linear programming
1. Introduction
The problem of distribution (allocation or division) is a
common, everyday problem. It consists of dividing a
certain amount among several (two or more) users. We
experience this problem every day through the distribution
of our salaries on life’s necessities, family members,
overhead expenses and other costs. The payment of wages
to workers and the distribution of incentives from certain
funds are also examples. The problem is not only connected
with the distribution of the financial resources. It also
covers the distribution of food, water, energy, oil and gas,
goods and any other property at the global or local levels.
The problem of distribution (PD) is easy to solve if the
available amount which has to be divided is large enough.
In fact, in this case the problem does not exist because each
user can get as much as he needs or requires. Usually, the
available amount is limited and such distribution is
impossible. In these cases, objective possibilities and the
aspirations of the users have to be respected, which implies
some kind of cooperation among the users.
The PD has been extensively studied in the literature and
it is usually considered as a cost and profit allocation
problem. Usually, researchers use cooperative games as the
framework in determining the algorithms for solving this
problem. The following text presents some papers in which
such ideas have been used.
In [2], the allocation of operating costs among the lines of
an insurance company as an accounting problem is
presented. It is proved that the cost allocation problem is
identical to the determination of the value of a cooperative
game with transferable utilities. A new method, called
‘proportional nucleus’ is proposed as a solution to the
problem.
In [3], the authors solve the cost and profit allocation
problem among connected companies, as well as the
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determination of production and transportation plans, by
applying a solution concept from game theory.
In [4], the cost allocation problem within the generalized
linear programming class of games is investigated. It is
assumed that a group of agents participate in a common
project and that each agent defines his requirements for his
expected benefit resulting from the project. The joint cost
or profit of the project must be allocated among the agents
in order to satisfy a set of required properties. The authors
present a general and efficient algorithmic framework for
computing exact cost allocations in generalized linear
programming games. The literature surveys of cost
allocation by linear programming and generalized linear
programming games are given in [5] and [6].
The game theoretic models of cost allocation used to solve
the cooperative advertising problems are studied in [7]. For
this purpose, different models are proposed. Some models
are focused on advertising spending by manufacturers and
retailers, and manufacturers’ support programmes for
local advertising.
The cost allocation problem also occurs in public utilities
[8], [9], the joint production of goods [7] and electricity [10],
[11], [12], [13], [14], the use of networks [15], accounting
[16], management [17] and other situations.
In this paper, we present a new approach to solve the cost
(profit) allocation (distribution) problem. The paper is an
application of a new method for solving a general multi-
objective linear programming problem (MOLPP) from [1].
The reasons for using it are its properties: (1) it is an iterative
method (if the obtained solution is not satisfactory, then it
can be improved by the next iteration(s)); (2) it is based on
the principles of game theory (cooperation among deci‐
sion-makers); (3) each iteration consists of a linear pro‐
gramming problem which yields a unique solution; (4) the
solution is obtained by respecting the aspirations of
decision-makers within the frame of given possibilities; (5)
in each iteration, we can compute objective indicators
which show the reality of aspirations and which may be
used to define the strategy for the next iteration. These
properties are very important in the solving procedure for
the considered distribution problem (which is a specific
case of MOLPP). The proposed method allows different
criteria to be involved in the solution process. For a better
understanding of how these possibilities become promi‐
nent according to the specific nature of the problem, we
provide several examples. The main contribution of the
paper is an application to an investment model (see Section
4) which suggests one means for economic recovery. The
benefits of such a model are confirmed by explicit mathe‐
matical results (with general and particular parameter
values).
2. Statement of the problem
Let b be the available amount (budget) which has to be
divided among n users (players) Pi, i =1, 2, ..., n, and let
x =(x1, x2, ..., xn)∈R
n. We define a general constraint set
B⊂R n, B ={x∈R n : x ≥0, x1 + x2 + ... + xn ≤b},  where xi
denotes the part of the available amount which may be
assigned to Pi. For n =2, the set B is sketched in Figure 1 (it
is the triangle OMN  where O(0, 0), M (b, 0), N (0, b)). Note
that, for practical reasons, the general set B may be reduced
to the available set S⊆B.
Figure 1. The constraint set (general and available)
For example, if we divide the entire budget b, then we have
x1 + x2 + ... + xn =b, which defines S  (the line MN  in Figure
1). We can also have restrictions for the lower bounds (xi ≥ gi
and/or x1 + x2 + ... + xn ≥ g) or for the upper bounds (xi ≤ ri),
which will reduce B to S  (see Figure 1). If we do not intend
to spend the whole budget b,  then a constraint such as
x1 + x2 + ... + xn ≤ r <b can appear as well. Various kinds of
other restrictions are also possible. Thus, the PD can be
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x x x S BÎ Í
(1)
Here, the word “optimize’’ does not have a strictly defined
meaning. The meaning may vary in different practical
situations, although generally it means the maximization
of some kind of utility which is not necessarily the amount
xi for each player Pi.Below we consider such alternative
optimization possibilities in the PD (1).
3. The new method for solving the problem
To solve the PD (1), we will use the technique from [1]. We
consider the standard case of proportional distribution and
the generalized case separately.
3.1 The standard case
First, we consider the well-known standard PD where each
of the players wants to maximize his part of the budget. In
this case, the PD (1) has the following form,
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( )1 2max , , ... .nx B x x xÎ (2)
Since (2) is MOLPP, we will use the new method, which
was established in [1], for such problems. Suppose that
some of the players Pi (or all of them) have the aspiration
level di. This means that Pi wants to get xi ≥di. Generally, di
may be any non-negative number. In practical situations,
di is an amount which Pi needs or expects. It can also be the
lower bound, i.e., the smallest amount which ensures the
normal functioning for Pi or for the sector i which Pi
represents. Thus, using [1] Sec. 1.1, we define the desired
budget,
{ }: 0, 1,2,..., ,n i iD x R x d i n= Î ³ ³ =
and, for λ ≥0, shifted desired budget,
{ }: 0, 1,2,..., ,n i iD x R x d i nl l= Î ³ ³ =
where, for each Pi who did not define his level di, we assume
that di =0 (see the graphic illustration in Figure 2 for n =2).
Here, we also assume that di ≠0 for at least one
i∈ {1, 2, ..., n}.
Figure 2. The standard case
According to [1] Sec. 1.1, we can state the following linear
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(3)
or more briefly, max
x∈B∩Dλ
λ . This problem is easy to solve. The
solution is (the point T  in Figure 2),
1 2
, 1,2,..., , where .
...i i n
bx d i n
d d d
l l* * *= = =
+ + +
(4)
The obtained solution is a standard proportional distribu‐
tion, x1∗ : x2∗ : ... : xn∗=d1 :d2 : ... :dn. Note that if Pi does not
define his aspiration level (di =0), then he gets nothing
(xi∗=0). The optimal value λ ∗ indicates to what extent the
desired aspirations may be realized.
Applying the same kind of analysis as in [1] Sec. 1.1, we can
make the following observations and comments. If a player
is not satisfied with the obtained solution (4), then the
aspiration levels need to be redefined and the problem (3)
has to be solved again. This determines the next step
(iteration) of the method. Note that since all the constraints
at the optimal point are active (equalities), any increase of
a certain aspiration level will cause a decrease in the
optimal values of the other players, and vice versa. Thus,
the redefinition of the aspiration levels is a matter of
agreement (cooperation) among the players. Note also that
any player Pi can define his absolute level gi (if the others
agree with that). In this case, the constraint xi ≥ gi - instead
of xi ≥λdi - participates in the definition of G. In other words,
this player does not participate in the definition of Dλ but
he causes the reduction of the general set B to S  (see Section
1). Many other cooperative restrictions for the next step,
such as xi + xj ≥ gij or xi + xj ≤ rij, etc., are also possible. In this
way, after several subsequent iterations based on coopera‐
tion, the players can reach the solution which will satisfy
all of them.
3.2 The generalized case
The generalization of the problem (2) is motivated and
directed by practical considerations. For example, suppose
that the state distributes incentives to different economic
sectors. The prosperity of an individual sector does not
depend only on the obtained incentive but also on the
production of other sectors. Such prosperity can be meas‐
ured by some kind of utility function for each sector
and/or for the whole economy.
For these reasons we assume that, in the problem (1), we
have k  utility functions ui(x1, x2, ..., xn), i =1, 2, ..., k . Here,
k  is generally independent of n (k  may be greater than n,
equal to n, less than n and even equal to 1). Note that ui is
not necessarily the utility function for the player Pi. It may
be assigned to a regulatory subject (state, government,
investor) or any other user. Now, the goal is to maximize
the utility functions ui, i =1, 2, ..., k  instead of the amounts
xi, i =1, 2, ..., n. We have
( )1 2max ( ), ( ), ..., ( ) ,kx S B u x u x u xÎ Í (5)
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which is the MOLPP again and thus the detailed analysis
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and di is the aspiration level for ui. This problem is one step
of the method. It can be iterated until the best possible
solution is obtained.
Very often, on the economic and the political stage, we can
see entities associated in coalitions. One expects to receive
greater benefits as a member of a given coalition than by
one’s self. Some ideas regarding coalitions were studied in
[18]. In light of our analysis, such ideas lead us to solve the
MOLPP (5) by using our method (6). To clarify this point,
we provide the following example.
Example 1. Suppose that we have four players
Pi, i =1, 2, 3, 4 with their utility functions
ui(x), i =1, 2, 3, 4, x∈R
n. If each player plays alone, then
we have the PD (5), max
x∈S
(u1(x), u2(x), u3(x), u4(x)).
Let us consider now the possibility of a coalition. Suppose
that uij(x) is the utility function for coalition
{Pi, P j}, i, j∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, i ≠ j. We have another six
problems with one two-member coalition,
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
12 3 4 13 2 4
14 2 3 23 1 4
24 1 3 34 1 2
     max ( ), ( ), ( ) ,       max ( ), ( ), ( ) ,
     max ( ), ( ), ( ) ,       max ( ), ( ), ( ) ,
     max ( ), ( ), ( ) ,       max ( ), ( ), ( ) ,  
x S x S
x S x S
x S x S
u x u x u x u x u x u x
u x u x u x u x u x u x




and three problems with two two-member coalitions,
( ) ( )
( )
12 34 13 24
14 23
     max ( ), ( ) , max ( ), ( ) ,
     max ( ), ( ) .
x S x S
x S
u x u x u x u x
u x u x
Î Î
Î
Similarly, if uijl(x) is the utility function for coalition
{Pi, P j, Pl}, i, j, l∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, i ≠ j, i ≠ l , j ≠ l , then we also
have four problems with one three-member coalition
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
123 4 124 3
134 2 234 1
max ( ), ( ) , max ( ), ( ) ,
max ( ), ( ) , max ( ), ( ) .
x S x S
x S x S
u x u x u x u x
u x u x u x u x
Î Î
Î Î
Finally, if we consider the global coalition {P1, P2, P3, P4}




Thus, if we permit all possible coalitions then we have 15
MOLPP problems (5) which may be solved using the
method (6). When all these solutions are known, the players
- who have the option to choose - can choose the best means
of coalition-building for themselves. After such a choice has
been made, the accepted solution may be modified just
because of the possibility of choosing (the player(s) who
have made a choice may require an additional stimulation
or reward). Here, in this example, we have permitted every
possible coalition, which is not the case in practical situa‐
tions. Some coalitions are useless or else impossible. This
can be clearly seen in everyday economic situations and
especially in political life.
To explain some of these possibilities, we provide the
following example.
Example 2. Suppose that the players Pi, i =1, 2, ..., n formed
three  coalitions  (k =3):  C1 ={Pi : i =1, 2, ..., n1},
C2 ={Pi : i =n1 + 1, n1 + 2, ..., n2}  and
C3 ={Pi : i =n2 + 1, n2 + 2, ..., n}. Let ui(x) be the utility func‐
tion and di be the aspiration level for coalition Ci, i =1, 2, 3.
We solve (5) by solving the assigned problem (6). Let λ∗=0.75
be the solution and x∗∈S be the optimal point. This means
that each coalition can realize its aspiration with at least 75%.
We can compute the indicators





Suppose that we obtained λ1 =0.81, λ2 =0.75, λ3 =0.9. We
see that C2 can realize exactly 75% (λ2 =λ∗), while the
realizations for C1 and C3 can be better (81% and 90%). This
means that d1 and d3 can be increased up to
31
1 1 1 3 3 31.08 , 1.2 ,d d d d d d
ll
l l* *
¢ ¢£ = £ =
without affecting the optimal solution λ∗=0.75. Why is it
that this solution cannot be larger? Because d2 is set too
high. If d2 is decreased, then the realizations become better.
If we want to have λ∗≥μ in the next iteration, we have to
require d ′i ≤ (λi / μ)di, i =1, 2, 3. For example, λ∗≥0.8 will be
ensured if d2 is decreased (d ′2≤0.9375d2), while d1 and d3 can
be even increased (d ′1≤1.0125d1, d ′3≤1.125d3). In this way,
the players can define a strategy which will lead to the final
satisfactory solution in the next iteration(s).
4. Applications
In the last few years, the economic crisis has become a
global problem. Many states are faced with reduced
production, consumption and social standards. New
progressive and useful investments are necessary to
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revitalize economic life. The following example is a small
contribution in this direction.
Example  3  (an  investment  model).  Suppose  that  the
economy of a considered state has two sectors, A and B.
We define two non-negative variables:  x1  and x2,  being
the production volume of sectors A and B, respectively.
The sectors  can buy goods and raw materials  for  their
production and consumption on the domestic market (A
from  B  and/or  B  from  A)  or  on  the  foreign  market
(imports). Similarly, the sectors can sell their products on
the domestic  market  (A to  B and/or  B to  A)  or  on the
foreign market (exports). Since our aim is to present the
model  in  a  general  form,  we define  the  basic  assump‐
tions  by  using  the  following  parameters.  Let  ri, qi, pi
denote the average export,  import and domestic prices,
respectively,  for  a  unit  of  the  production  range  of  the
sectors A (i =1)  and B (i =2).  Let a  (b)  be the number of
purchased goods and amount of raw materials per unit
of  production of  the sectors A (B).  Let  di  and ci  be the
fixed costs and variable costs per unit of production of
the sectors A (i =1) and B (i =2), respectively.
We  suppose  that  the  government  ensures  the  invest‐
ment  fund  f  for  economic  recovery.  The  criterion  of
distribution from the fund to the sectors A and B is based
on the  planned effects  of  this  investment.  The  govern‐
ment will stimulate exports by ε  per penny of exported
goods,  and  buying  on  the  domestic  market  by  β  per
penny  of  purchased  goods.  At  the  same  time,  to  in‐
crease  production  and  employment,  it  will  discourage
imports  (by  using  certain  restrictive  rules  such  as
additional taxes, laws, etc.) by γ  per penny of imported
goods.  The measure  for  the  efficacy  of  any investment
will  be  the  total  revenue  of  each  sector.  How  can  the
distribution be realized according to the given criteria?
The  PD  here  is  the  MOLPP  (5)  with  two  utility  func‐
tions: the total revenue function u1 for sector A and u2 for
sector  B.  The constraint  set  S  is  given by the available
amount in the investment fund. We have the following
four cases.
I  The  sectors  do  not  cooperate.  They import  necessary
goods and export their products. The stimulation is given




1 1 1 1 2 1
2 2 2 2 1 2
1 1 2 2
A max ( ) (1 ) (1 ) ,
B max ( ) (1 ) (1 )
under constraint   .
u x r x aq x
u x r x bq x




® = + - +
® = + - +
+ £
The fund distribution is: εr1x1 to A and εr2x2 to B.
II  Sector A cooperates with B. This means that A buys
necessary  goods  from B while  B  imports.  The  stimula‐
tion is  given for  exports  (which is  now r1x1  for  A and
r2(x2−ax1)  for B) and for domestic purchases ap2x1  while




1 1 1 1 2 1
2 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 2
1 1 2 2 1 2 1
2 1
A max ( ) (1 ) (1 ) ,
B max ( , ) (1 ) (1 )
under constraints   ,
0 .
u x r x ap x
u x x r x ax ap x bq x





® = + - -
® = + - + - +
é ù+ - + £ë û
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Note  that  the  last  constraint  ensures  that  B  produces
enough to meet the needs of A. The fund distribution is:
εr1x1 + βap2x1 to A and εr2(x2−ax1) to B.
III The sector B cooperates with A. This means that B buys
necessary goods from A while A imports. The export is now
r2x2 for B and r1(x1−bx2) for A, while the domestic purchas‐




1 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 1
2 2 2 2 1 2
1 1 2 2 2 1 2
1 2
A max ( , ) (1 ) (1 )
B max ( ) (1 ) (1 ) ,
under constraints   ,
0 .
u x x r x bx bp x aq x
u x r x bp x





® = + - + - +
® = + - -
é ù- + + £ë û
- ³
The fund distribution is: εr1(x1−bx2) to A and εr2x2 + βbp1x2
to B.
IV The sectors cooperate. They buy from each other and
export the rest of their products. The exports are now
r1(x1−bx2) for A and r2(x2−ax1) for B, while the domestic
purchasing is ap2x1 + bp1x2. We have
( ){ }
( ){ }
( ) ( )
( )
1 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 1
2 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 2
1 1 2 2 2 1
2 1 1 2
1 2 2 1
A max ( , ) (1 ) (1 )
B max ( , ) (1 ) (1 ) ,
under constraints   
                             ,
0, 0 .
u x x r x bx bp x ap x
u x x r x ax ap x bp x
r x bx r x ax
ap x bp x f





® = + - + - -
® = + - + - -
é ù- + - +ë û
+ + £
- ³ - ³
The fund distribution is: εr1(x1−bx2) + βap2x1 to A and
 εr2(x2−ax1) + βbp1x2 to B.
These problems could be solved by solving the assigned
LPP (6). The desired budget D and the shifted budget Dλ
are defined by using the fixed costs di, i =1, 2 as the
aspiration levels, which is a natural choice. When the
optimal solution (x1*, x2*) is known, the profit of each sector
is given by
1 2 1 2( , ) ( , ) , 1 for A,   2 for B.i i i i ix x u x x d c x i ip
* * * * *= - - = =
Now, we will illustrate the given investment model for the
following values of the parameters
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1 1 2 2 2
1 2 1 2
, , 20,21,22 , , , 32,30,34 ,
, 0.3, 0.5
, 5000000, 8000000 , , 6,10 ,
, , 0.4, 0.2, 0.2 , 15000000.
r q p r q p
a b






For each of Cases I-IV, we state the MOLPP (5) and the
assigned LPP (6).
I In the first case, we have
( )1 2




max 17.2 , 32.2 , max
8 12.8 15000000 12.8 15000000
, 0 17.2 5000000
32.2 8000000
                                              , , 0
x x































II In the second case, we have
( )1 1 2
1 2 1 2
2 1 2 1
1 2 1
1 2
max 19.84 , 3.24 32.2 , max
6.2 12.8 15000000 6.2 12.8 15000000
0.3 0 0.3 0
, 0    19.84 5000000
3.24 32.2 8000000
                                                          
x x x
x x x x







+ £ Þ + £
- ³ - ³
³ ³
- + ³
1 2, , 0x xl ³



















III In the third case, we have
( )1 2 2
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
2
1 2
max 17.2 3 , 36 , max
8 11 15000000 8 11 15000000
0.5 0 0.5 0
, 0 17.2 3 5000000
36 8000000
                                             , , 0
x x x
x x x x
x x x x








+ £ Þ + £























IV In the fourth case, we have
( )1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
2 1 2 1
1 2 1 2
1 2
max 19.84 3 , 3.24 36 , max
6.2 11 15000000 6.2 11 15000000
0.5 0   0.5 0
0.3 0 0.3 0
, 0 19.84 3 5000000
3.24 36 8000000
                                       
x x x x
x x x x
x x x x
x x x x






+ £ Þ + £
- ³ - ³
- ³ - ³
³ - ³
- + ³
1 2                        , , 0x xl ³



















The obtained results do not require much comment – the
benefits of such an investment for economic recovery are
obvious. The mutual cooperation between the sectors and
the export orientation (the fourth case) significantly
increases their production volume, total revenue and
profit. Note that in this case the total profit of the sectors
exceeds the investment fund., Thus the sectors alone have
sufficient funds for further investments.
5. Conclusions
In the paper, we apply the new, efficient method which was
established in [1] for solving the cost (profit) allocation
(distribution) problem. We consider both the standard and
the generalized case.
In the standard case of proportional distribution, the
players maximize the amount which they would obtain
according to their aspirations. The optimal value of the
indicator λ shows to what extent the aspirations can be
realized. If a player is not satisfied with the realization, then
the next step (iteration) can be performed.
The generalized case is more interesting. The players can
form coalitions to increase profit. In this case, the allocation
is determined by the maximization of certain utility
functions. There is an indicator with the same meaning and
also the possibility of iteration. We apply the method in
order to analyse an investment model for economic
recovery. Financial incentives for exports and for buying
6 Int J Eng Bus Manag, 2015, 7:5 | doi: 10.5772/60121
on the domestic market would revitalize the economy of a
state. The production volume, total revenue and profit of
various economic sectors would be significantly increased.
The explicit mathematical results clearly confirm this
conclusion.
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